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CHAPTER 9 
Domestic Relations and Persons 
WILLIAM J. GREENLER, JR. 
A. MARRIAGE 
§9.1. Antenuptial contract in derogation of marriage. An inter-
esting question of public policy was passed on in the case of Kovler 
v. Vagenheim,l wherein the defendant brothers sought to avoid liability 
upon an agreement whereby, in consideration of the plaintiff's marry-
ing their sister, who was pregnant, they agreed to indemnify plaintiff 
for all the sums he might be required to pay "through any judicial 
proceeding, or threat of judicial proceeding, or for any other reason" 2 
for support and maintenance of the woman and any child she might 
bear. Plaintiff married her, the child was born, and then plaintiff 
obtained a divorce in which the woman was given custody and an 
order for support of the child. 
The Court rejected contentions that such an agreement was in 
derogation of marriage and in encouragement of separation and 
divorce, pointing out that if anything it was in aid of marriage, and 
only encouraged separation or divorce by whatever trivial effect the 
easing of the financial burden might indirectly have. The agreement 
was therefore held enforceable and not against public policy. 
The case is one of first impression in Massachusetts but the Court 
cited as precedent two decisions in other states.3 Some have found 
basis for distinguishing these from the Kovler case.4 
It is interesting to speculate whether this agreement could be con-
strued as one contemplating a future separation or divorce5 and thus 
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and 9.8 of this chapter. 
§9.1. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1037, 130 N.E.2d 557. 
21955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1037, 130 N.E.2d at 558. 
8 Wright v. Wright, 114 Iowa 748, 87 N.W. 709 (1901); Specht v. Richter. 258 Ill. 
App. 22 (1930). 
4 Note, 11 Miami L.Q. 143. 144 (1956). 
II It has been held unnecessary that the antenuptial agreement contain an express 
mention of divorce where it can be shown by other evidence that this was the specific 
object of the contract. It may even be shown by parol evidence. Cumming v. Cum-
ming. 127 Va. 16. 102 S.E. 572 (1920). 
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"a bargain about an event which they are not entitled to anticipate." 6 
Most agreements held invalid as attempts to modify the marital rela-
tionship are contracts between husband and wife,7 but the public 
policy, as first enunicated in Maynard v. Hill,s which the Court seeks 
to protect might still be endangered whether the spouses are parties to 
the contract or whether a third party is involved. 
§9.2. Application of validating statute to foreign marriage. A 
significant decision involving the application of G.L., c. 207, §6, which 
validates bigamous marriages from and after the removal of the im-
pediment if the parties live together in good faith on the part of one, is 
found in the case of Fraser v. Fraser'! In that case the third wife 
brought a bill for a declaratory judgment as to her status, naming 
the husband and the second wife as respondents.2 The crucial issue 
was whether the second marriage, which in the beginning was bigamous 
because it took place before the divorce from the first wife was ab-
solute, was validated under the aforementioned statute. The second 
wife testified that they went to New Hampshire to be married because 
the husband said he would have to wait six months in Massachusetts, 
but that it was all right in New Hampshire; that she believed they 
had a right to marry in New Hampshire and return to Massachusetts to 
live. The probate judge found that she acted in good faith, that the 
marriage was subsequently validated under the statute, and therefore 
the third marriage (to petitioner) was void. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed this, holding that the second 
wife, on her testimony, "must be held to have known" 3 that the husband 
was incapable of entering a valid marriage in this Commonwealth, 
therefore the marriage was an attempt to evade the laws of this 
Commonwealth and invalid under G.L., c. 207, §10. The Court said 
this is not the "good faith" to which Section 6 applies. 
In the Fraser opinion the Court considers and distinguishes the 
Vital case,4 wherein the woman went to New Hampshire and contracted 
a marriage within the two-year prohibited period after the man's 
divorce,5 and it was held that her marriage was later validated under 
Section 6 because she acted in good faith, not knowing he did not 
have the right to marry in this Commonwealth. While the distinction 
may be technically valid, it is far from realistic. In the Vital case the 
woman knew of the divorce, yet was held not to be on notice as to the 
6 Marlborough v. Marlborough [1901]. 1 Ch. 165. 
7 Peck v. Peck, 155 Mass. 479, 30 N.E. 74 (1892). See also Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 
196. 69 A.2d 831 (1949); Safranski v. Safran ski. 222 Minn. 358, 24 N.W.2d 834 (1946); 
McLean v. McLean, 237 N.C. 122,74 S.E.2d 320 (1953). 
8125 U.S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654 (1888). 
§9.2. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 133 N.E.2d 236. 
2 Hogan v. Hogan. 320 Mass. 658, 70 N.E.2d 821 (1947), establishes that such status 
is the proper subject of a declaratory judgment. 
31956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 424. 133 N.E.2d 236. 238. 
4 Vital v. Vital, 319 Mass. 185,65 N.E.2d 205 (1946). 
Ii G.L.. c. 208. §24. 
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law relative to remarriage: in other words, good faith was determined 
by a purely subjective standard, and recognized according to the 
woman's. actual knowledge and belief although it may have been im-
prudent or even stupid. In the Fraser case, however, the woman is 
charged in effect with knowledge of the law applicable to the facts in 
her possession: and an objective test is used to determine not what 
she knew, it seems, but what she should have known. As a practical 
matter it is hard to distinguish the "good faith" of the women involved 
in the two cases, except to say that a different standard is applied. Yet 
the distinction is indeed technically valid, and once we concede that 
as a matter of fact the woman in the Vital case did not know of the 
prohibition but the woman in Fraser did, then there can be no 
quarrel with this case. 
Justice Counihan wrote a forceful dissent reasoning that the Vital 
case establishes that Section 6 overrides Section 10 in these circum-
stances, and that "good faith" means actual honesty of purpose - a 
subjective test, as mentioned above. He also argues that the present 
petitioner, having entered the marriage with full knowledge of all the 
circumstances, should not be allowed to obtain indirectly the relief 
which the husband could not have obtained directly for himself. This 
approach seems equitable as it does not allow the husband to avoid his 
second marriage and to take on a third, thus defeating the general 
purpose of the marriage statutes to promote the stability of marriage 
and to protect offspring. 
B. DIVORCE 
§9.3. Grounds: Neglect, cruel and abusive treatment. In two 
cases, Young v. Young! and Denisi v. Denisi,2 the Court's refusal 
to grant the relief sought might be interpreted as further evidence of a 
stiffening attitude on the part of the bench toward divorce.3 In the 
Young case the Court affirmed a decision of a probate judge denying 
a libel brought on grounds of cruel and abusive treatment and neglect 
to provide suitable maintenance. Here the Court stated that the 
neglect must be done "grossly or wantonly and cruelly." 4 Neglect or 
refusal to provide which does not cause privation, suffering, or hard-
ship falls short of the requirements of the statute.5 
The Denisi libel alleged failure to provide and cruel and abusive 
treatment. The latter charge also was dismissed. The facts found were 
that the parties separated in 1952. The last blow struck by the libellee 
had been about ten years before, although he might have pushed libel-
lant mildly in 1952. It was asserted that the real reason libellant left 
was because he had committed an act of incest upon their daughter. 
§9.3. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1029, 129 N.E.2d 894. 
21956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 903, 135 N.E.2d 668. 
3 See 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.3. 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1029, 1030, 129 N.E.2d 894, 895. 
5 G.L., c. 208, §l. 
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There was no gross neglect to provide. In a brief decision the Court 
upheld the dismissal. 
Clearly, an act of cruelty committed upon the daughter is not, as 
such, cruelty upon the wife. Quite conceivably, however, acts com-
mitted with or upon another, if done with actual or constructive in-
tent to injure the wife, might constitute mental cruelty upon her.6 
This case does not say otherwise, but merely points out that on the 
findings of fact here such cruelty was negatived. Caution should be 
taken, therefore, not to apply the case further than the foregoing 
warrants. 
§9.4. Grounds: Voluntary intoxication. In Jasper v. Jasper1 the 
Court had before it a libel for divorce by a husband and a petition 
for separate support by the wife, tried together. The husband alleged 
gross and confirmed habits of intoxication caused by the use of drugs.2 
The probate judge dismissed the libel and granted the separate sup-
port. In summary, he found that the husband was a domineering 
husband and father, and frequently humiliated his wife by his atti-
tude. She became nervously ill and depressed, and used sedatives and 
barbiturates on the advice of her physicians, and may have to continue 
to do so the rest of her life. The judge found that the wife had not 
acquired the drug habit by the "voluntary and excessive use" of drugs. 
The Court in affirming the decision stated: "That finding we construe 
to mean that in any event she had not contracted the habit." 3 
Taken in this light the case cannot be assailed, since the negative 
finding of fact removed any question of law. It would be interesting 
to go one step further and suppose that she had in fact acquired the 
habit as a consequence of the originally proper use of drugs in pur-
suance of doctors' prescriptions. This would have squarely posed the 
question of the meaning of "voluntary": whether the word is used in 
a technical sense, indicating a free-will act, or whether the word may 
be susceptible of a looser construction, meaning free from any com-
pulsion or duress. In the latter event it might be held that the ac-
quisition of the habit under such circumstances was not "voluntary," 
due to the difficulty and hardship of the alternative choice of action. 
The Jasper case, however, does not pass upon this question. It should 
not be considered as authority for the broad proposition that the use 
of drugs upon advice of doctors may never constitute cause for divorce. 
§9.5. Certificates of divorce. The certificate of divorce which must 
be produced in order to obtain a license to remarry no longer need 
contain the cause of the divorce, under a 1956 amendment of the law.1 
The certification of a divorce by a probate judge where the usual 
certificate cannot be obtained now carries a fee of three dollars.2 
6 See, for instance. Brown v. Brown. 323 Mass. 332. 81 N.E.2d 820 (1948). 
§9.4. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1005. 129 N.E.2d 887. 
2 G.L.. c. 208. §1. 
31955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1005. 1008. 129 N.E.2d 887, 889. 
§9.5. 1 Acts of 1956. c. 9. amending G.L .• c. 207, §21. 
2 Acts of 1956. c. 7. amending G.L .• c. 207. §22. and c. 262. §40. 
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C. HUSBAND AND WIFE 
§9.6. Contract for married woman's services. The case of Cum-
mings v. Brenci1 involved the validity of a contract made by a married 
woman to perform household services for another man in such a way 
as to derogate from her marital duties to her husband. 
The plaintiff, a married woman estranged from her husband, sued 
the estate of a man in whose house she had lived with her minor 
daughter and acted as his business manager and housekeeper. The 
defense was in substance that a contract for such services was against 
public policy because it interfered with her husband's right to her 
time and services. The Court rejected this contention, stating that 
under the enabling statutes2 a married woman is now empowered to 
contract regarding her own time and services, and the possibility that 
such a contract might interfere with her marital duties must have been 
intended by the legislature. No contrary public policy is recognized. 
D. PARENT AND CHILD 
§9.7. Use of surname of infant child. In Mark v. Kahn l the par-
ties had two children. They were divorced, and the wife was given 
custody and an order for support. The wife was remarried to a man 
who had three children by a prior marriage. The present action was 
a bill in equity to enjoin the wife from registering the two children 
in school under the surname of the stepfather. The probate judge 
ordered an injunction. 
The Supreme Judicial Court first faced the question whether equity 
could grant relief under the circumstances, and decided that it could: 
that equity may protect personal as well as property rights by injunc-
tion where the usual tests are met, namely, substantial impairment of 
rights, lack of adequate legal remedy, and practicability of injunctive 
relief. This seems sound. 
The Court then proceeded to consider whether an injunction was 
proper here, and found that the controlling issue was the best interests 
of the children; and since the findings were deemed insufficient upon 
that issue, the case was remanded. 
It is somewhat difficult to reconcile the one proposition, that the 
father has substantial personal rights which will be protected in equity, 
with the other proposition, that the "crucial and controlling issue" is 
whether the use of the stepfather'S surname is for the best interests of 
the children. The latter proposition suggests that a right of the chil-
dren, rather than that of the plaintiff, is involved. If the plaintiff 
has a personal right of his own, and no conduct of his bars him from 
seeking relief, it would seem that he should be afforded it. 
§9.6. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 577, 134 N.E.2d 133. 
2 G.L., c. 209, §§2, 4, 6. 
§9.7. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 135, 131 N.E.2d 758. 
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The case is of first impression here, and the Court found no cases in 
other jurisdictions in point. 
§9.8. Adoptions: The religious question. The question of the 
effect of a difference in religious persuasion between a child and pro-
spective adopting parents was once again brought to the attention of 
the bar of Massachusetts in 1956, but this time in a legislative rather 
than in a judicial setting. 
A bill 1 was proposed in the General Court to amend G.L. c. 210, 
§5B, which provides that in 'making orders for adoption the judge, 
"when practicable," must give custody only to persons of the same 
religious faith as that of the child. Where dispute exists, the religion 
of the child is taken to be that of its mother. 
Under the proposed amendment the requirement of a placement 
with parents of the same religious faith as the mother's would be 
eliminated from the present requirements in any case where the 
mother consents to a placement with adopting parents of a different 
faith than hers. 
The proposed amendment would appear to have been directly in-
fluenced by the decision in the now famous Goldman case,2 and is also 
directed toward the kind of situation that arose in the more recent 
case of Ellis v. McCoy.s In the Goldman case, the natural mother of 
the children, a Catholic, with full knowledge of the fact that the 
petitioners were members of the Jewish faith, consented to the adop-
tion of her children by them. This consent was never withdrawn. 
Despite this, and a finding by the probate judge that "the petitioners 
are well equipped financially and physically to bring up the twins, 
and that they have treated them as their own children and intend to 
care for them and educate them to the best of their ability," the pro-
bate judge denied the petition, finding that "it was practicable to give 
custody only to persons of the Catholic faith." 4 The denial of the 
petition for adoption was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
It would appear that the effect of the proposed bill would be to 
allow a decree of adoption in a case such as the Goldman case where 
the prospective parents are found suitable in every way except for 
being of a religious persuasion different from that of the child's natural 
mother. 
In the legislative hearings, it was argued by the proponents of the 
bill that the result of the legislation would be to give effect to the 
desires of the natural mother of the child concerning its religious up-
bringing which they assert is not possible under the holding in Gold-
man, since the ultimate result of that case is to effectively prohibit 
any adoption across religious lines even where the petitioners have ob-
tained the valid consent of the natural mother. It was also argued 
that the result in the Ellis case would not be disturbed since the natural 
§9.8. 1 House No. 1385 (1956). 
2331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954). 
S 332 Mass. 254, 124 N.E.2d 266 (1955). 
4331 Mass. at 650, 121 N.E.2d at 845. 
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mother would still be able to withdraw her consent at any time prior 
to the decree, and any consent to be effective would have to be made 
with full knowledge of all of the pertinent facts. In the Ellis case 
it appeared that the mother did not know of the disparity in religion 
at the time she consented to the adoption. She was subsequently al-
lowed to withdraw her consent. 
At the same hearings, the opponents of the amendment contended 
that the Goldman case does not stand for the proposition that no 
adoption across religious lines may be decreed. They argued that 
the Goldman case left the matter of granting or denying such adop-
tions within the discretion of the probate judge, that is, if the interests 
of the child would best be served by allowing an adoption in a case 
where the religion of the child differed from that of the prospective 
parents, it was within his power to order such an adoption. It was 
the position of the amendment's opponents that the effect of the 
Goldman case was in no way mandatory, but still left the weighing of 
the religious question within the power of the probate judge's dis-
cretion along with the general issue of the suitability of the prospec-
tive parents in all other aspects.5 
The bill was reported upon favorably by the Joint Committee on 
Legal Affairs, but was not passed by the legislature. It was, however, 
reported to the next annual session. Thus it is quite possible that 
the end of this bill has not yet been seen, and that another chapter 
may yet be written in the stormy history in this commonwealth of the 
question of the effect of religious differences in adoption cases. 
5 For a discussion of evidence problems in adoption cases under G.L., c. 210, §5B, 
see 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §22.2. 
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